The War on Piracy

For the first time in nearly two-hundred years the United States has suffered a Pirate attack on the high seas. For almost a week the captain of the MAERSK Company freighter Alabama was held at gunpoint by four Somali pirates. Thankfully, the situation ended with the termination of those pirates and the release of the freighter captain. However, this pirate threat is not something to take lightly. It represents a continuing clear and present danger to vital American and global economic interests. Like a Cancer, the Pirate threat will continue to grow and metastasize into a major threat, lest something drastic is done to stop it. It is my contention that this Somali Pirate Threat (and the government’s view of these Pirates) is disturbingly similar to the view that the US government took about al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the 1990s. A view which perpetuated ignorance and misperceptions about the real danger posed to America; lulled us into a false sense of security, forced us into a state of perpetual denial, and led to the horrific events of September 11, 2001. If we are not careful, this threat could balloon up into a serious global threat as al Qaeda was allowed to do from Afghanistan.

For well over a decade the nation of Somalia has suffered mightily to say the least. The nation has been fragmented by sectarian violence, ravaged by disease, famine, and seen the horrors of genocide. In recent years, the nation was torn apart by a brutal civil war which ultimately saw the dissolution of the nation’s government; this dissolution, some would say, led to a foreign “occupation” by Ethiopian troops in 2006. However, even the Ethiopians - with rumored American assistance - could not hold the country. Indeed, New York Times reporter Jeffrey Gettleman, put it best in his March 2009 Foreign Policy article “The Most Dangerous Place in the World“ when he proclaimed “Somalia is a state governed only by anarchy. A graveyard of foreign-policy failures, it has known just six months of peace in the past two decades.” Not surprisingly, this account of a failed state torn apart by anarchic sectarian violence, brimming with religious overtones, mirrors the stories that were told of Afghanistan in the post-Soviet War era. When reading Steven Coll’s history of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, entitled “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001” the reader is met with countless descriptions of the anarchy which consumed that nation and, ultimately led to the rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda as leaders there. The key thing one must take away from those accounts is the idea that although the US government would acknowledge the threat of al Qaeda and Taliban-led Afghanistan, they would consistently underestimate and misinterpret that threat, which allowed for the failed policies that defined the 90s, and ultimately led to the worst case scenario: a surprise attack upon the United States.

The problem with the Somali pirates is not that they take over ships, demand money, and hold some people hostage (that’s bad, but it’s not the real issue); the real problem is what the nations who are the victims of these attacks do to prevent such attacks from recurring. The sad fact is those nations that have been targeted in the past have followed similar courses that nations and groups targeted by al Qaeda in the past did: they capitulated. These marauders come riding in on their fishing boats-turned-buccaneers from the bustling port city of Boosaaso, board the ships, hold the crews hostage, and demand exorbitant amounts of cash. The world’s military’s very rarely react with force (either because they could not arrive at the location in time or because their leaders decided to negotiate) and either the ship’s parent company or its nation of origin decide to give the Pirates what they want; proving one thing: piracy works. In 2008 alone, more than 40 vessels were overtaken and over a $100 million paid to the pirates in ransom. Like al Qaeda of the 90s, when the pirates’ attacks were met with capitulation, they became emboldened rather than pacified, and with the money they’ve gained, the pirates increased their attacks with greater zeal and in greater scope. It’s only a matter of time before traveling the Gulf of Aden - at least without massive military assistance - became far too costly to continue. Indeed, prior to the MAERSK Alabama Incident earlier this week, the maritime powers already decided to move the Gulf of Aden Shipping Lanes farther away from the Somali coastline and it did nothing to stem the pirates’ will.

Herein lies the crux of the pirate issue: the pirates aren’t just attacking freighters filled with precious cargo, manned by innocent merchant sailors…they’re attacking the global economy. In a January 2008 report, the US Department of Energy identified seven key oil transit “chokepoints” around the world and the Gulf of Aden shipping lanes were the third most important lane. In this report, the DOE speculated that any stoppage or reduction in travel along these lanes - for whatever reason - would severely wound the international economy because it would force the transport companies to take alternate, longer routes, thereby increasing their cost of transport; causing all other costs for that product to increase. As stated in the report, if just even a fraction of the oil transports which pass through the Gulf of Aden were forced to divert and take alternate routes, it’d cause the price of oil on the global market to spike until those lanes could be reopened. In fact, the 2008 DOE report was written specifically to outline the growing dangers piracy posed to the global economic stability - particularly regarding oil. Although a majority of these transports have been non-petroleum-transporting craft, in late November 2008 a Saudi oil tanker was taken captive. Thankfully it was only one and its load was relatively light. But, as these pirates grow and go untamed, they will begin coordinating their attacks and honing in on targets which would yield greater booty. Al Qaeda acted similarly in the 90s. Once they coalesced into a fighting force in post-Soviet Afghanistan, they began slowly targeting the United States and its allies. Initially their attacks were disparate and small-time, however, the more they were allowed to continue their work and fester in Afghanistan, the more they perfected their methods, and the deadlier they became. This is the danger of not responding or, at least, not responding swiftly.

The conditions of anarchy in Somalia are ripe for the picking, if you’re an Islamist. There is no functioning government to stop incursions by recruiters of al Qaeda or to douse the flames of resentment, many of the people there are well armed and experienced in guerilla-style warfare, and almost all of the 10 million Somalis belong to the Sunni-brand of Islam - the same Islamic sect which the Saudis and, more importantly, al Qaeda identifies with. Although there is no entity which actually runs Somalia, al Shabab, the Wahabbi al Qaeda-backed terror group, has major pull above all other groups in Somalia. Suppose these pirates were to align with al Shabab. Imagine the nightmare scenario that would be: an al Qaeda affiliate would suddenly have a de facto navy. This is something which could occur if the situation is left unchecked or, at least, continues to be handled in the passive-aggressive manner it’s been up until this point.

Many argue that we should begin arming the transports. This is a fine stopgap, however, it is not a solution since this will merely lead to escalation. As Commissioner Gordon opined to Batman at the end of Batman Begins, if “we start carrying semi-automatics, they’ll start carrying automatics”, it will only exacerbate the situation. Many seem to berate the private shipping company’s for paying the ransom (as do I). However, to be fair, they are businessmen designed to make money, not wage war. If the military is unwilling or unable to defend them, it actually becomes more economical to simply pay the pirates off and allow their transports to go on about their business. Indeed, insurance companies love the prospect of arming up private merchants since it would increase the amount of money the shipping companies would have to pay them. This is untenable for any business. The solution, then, will not be found in the private citizen on this one. It will be found in a bold foreign policy which coordinates a strong military action with increased diplomatic measures to quash the threat of piracy.

Recent reports from Politico.com and other sources have indicated that President Obama is looking for military options to thwarting the ongoing pirate threat. One option which has been floated by the Obama Administration (and one which Obama supposedly favors) involves the United States moving in, attacking the coastline pirate bases, helping the Somalis establish a coast guard, and giving aide to that nation to bring stability and remove the prism of anarchy in which it exists. Aside from the flagrant political hypocrisy of this plan (both Obama and his Democratic Party unabashedly assaulted the Bush Administration for utilizing the same preemption and nation-building measures in Iraq he now proposes), it is also severely flawed. While I will never bet against the United States military’s ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome; given the state of chaos Somalia is in, I do doubt the government’s political will to see such a policy through to its proper end: a freer and stable Somalia.

Some inherent flaws with Obama’s proposed strategy (which I seriously doubt will even be implemented given his distance from this topic) are the facts that simply taking out existing pirate bases won’t do; we have to prevent them from coming back to the coastline and restarting their violent enterprise. Given how much money has been made, the lack of proper response from the victims, and how desperate the situation in Somalia is, the pirate “industry” in Somalia would come back in no time. Yet another flaw with the President’s supposed plan is this proposed Somali-run Coast Guard. In order for there to be a Somali-run Coast Guard there has to be a Somali government for which that Coast Guard reports to and receives supplies and personnel from. In case the President didn’t realize this, there is no government in Somalia. The only group which appears powerful enough to form a government is the al Qaeda-backed Wahabbi Islamist group known as al Shabab. Clearly, backing them would be akin to playing Russian Roulette. The next option would be to form a coalition government through the various warlords and clans which comprise Somali society. However, that’d take years to do, loads of money, and would require the US to put boots on the ground for prolonged periods of time. The reason forming a whole new government would be difficult would be due to the fact that these Clans are divided by centuries-old conflict, they have shifting alliances, and their histories are so convoluted that no outsider has ever been able to fully understand and take advantage of them. Nation-building, of any kind at this time, would be seriously taxing on our forces to say the least.

Up until this point, I’ve failed to mention allied involvement in the President’s plan because, given their lack of response up until this point (on both this issue and so many others), I somehow won’t be counting on their assistance - particularly the Europeans (despite apparent French support for escalating against the Pirates). Nation-building is a long-term solution which would require excessive amount of action. What we need now is swift, immediate action which would solve our short-term problems. However, this short-term solution need not be short-sighted. We should authorize a short-term solution which would also allow us to segue into the more long-term solution of nation-building, after we’ve finished our commitment to the Global War on Terror, and allowed our forces to regroup and reequip.

A far better, less costly, solution would be to have our supremely powerful naval forces operating in that region blast the coastline pirate bases with aerial bombardment, and then send in small units of Special Forces and Marines to establish firebases along the coastline. This would create a sort of foothold scenario, which would deprive the pirates of access to the waterway, and then have the Navy create a blockade of the Somalia coastline for good measure. A key target should be the Pirate-laden port city of Boosasso. That city is seen as the most prosperous in Somalia, and many speculate that it owes its newfound prosperity to the piratical activity of its denizens on the Gulf of Aden shipping lanes.

The Obama Administration seems to want to enact the Bush Doctrine, without saying the name. In the long-run, I wholeheartedly believe nation-building is a good strategy, and the only way to truly solve the Somali issue is through some form of Bush-style nation-building. However, we need immediate action and, unfortunately, the military is becoming overstretched with the ongoing Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns in the Global War on Terror (not to mention all of the other global commitments the US military must fulfill). It simply is irresponsible for President Obama to even begin thinking about major nation-building operations in Somalia at this time. It would seem the Democrats are repeating the same mistake they made in the 90s: they are significantly cutting defense spending whilst increasing operational demands on an already-strained force. That simply is not a sustainable policy. Indeed, when analyzing much of our logistical problems in Iraq, they can be traced back to the massive cuts President Clinton made during the 90s to create his “Peace Dividend”, cuts which were never truly rectified by the Bush Administration to meet the growing demands on our military, and are only now being slightly addressed. Regardless how the Obama Administration spins their Somali Coast Guard plan…it’s nation building. We simply don‘t have the resources to perform that right now. If everyone thought that we were in Iraq for too long (which technically was still a functioning state under Saddam), imagine how long we’d be bogged down in Somalia - with all the clans and sub-clans with shifting alliances, not to mention the vehemently anti-American Islamists - with an overstretched and overburdened military!

That is why sending in a small force predominantly of Marines and Special Forces to secure the coastline and hold it while the Navy boxes the country in through blockade is the best solution. It allows us to have our cake and eat it. We can take out the immediate threat, prevent it from returning, all without the headache of having GIs patrol dangerous Somali streets indefinitely. Another bonus is that this would signal to both the world and the Somalis that we are no longer going to leave them behind. We will no longer tolerate piracy. With the establishment of our foothold we would at least have a presence in the region. This would allow our intelligence and diplomatic corps to begin making better contacts in the nation, which could eventually pave the way for the eventual move to nation-build. We would be methodically and patiently laying a groundwork rather than “rushing in” (as so many Liberal critics accused the Bush Administration of doing regarding the Iraqi Theater of the Global War on Terror).

Another issue I see in combating this problem is the culture of denial among the Washington intellengsia. This comes from both Democrats and Republicans. So many of these purported experts proclaim that the pirates have no ideology other than their thirst for money and the fact they’re thugs. Indeed, many Democrats refuse to even acknowledge these pirates as Terrorists. It is true these pirates are thugs and they act like it. However, as noted earlier, a majority of that country’s population worship Sunni Islam and a significant power player in Somali politics is the Islamist terror group al Shabab. Just as the infamous Barbary Coast Pirates (which plagued the US and other nations off of North Africa two-hundred years prior) were fueled primarily by economics, Captain Pasha and his band of pirates back then justified their actions and acquired new recruits through the teachings of the Koran. The same holds true for these Somali Pirates. Once the Washington elite acknowledge the dangers of an Islamist-backed (or at least, inspired) pirate threat in Somalia and begin calling them Terrorists, we can begin moving in a more assertive, concerted, aggressive manner.

There is some hidden value with increasing our presence in Somalia as well: we can use this as an impetus for increasing and establishing a prolonged presence in the greater Indian Ocean region - especially if the government endorses my plan - which I believe will be a serious hotspot of activity in the near future (especially with rising China and India competing for control there). This would give us the opportunity to create stronger ties with India. We should probably also work with South Africa for greater involvement as well as Australia and Japan. These nations, I believe, will be the bedrock of a coalition for future balance of power operations the United States will have to embark upon, in order to contain China’s rise. In the long-run, once the United States felt it was capable of engaging in a nation-building exercise, Somalia could be a sort of dry run to see how these nations would work together to balance the Rising Dragon.

One, final issue I see with our current policy regarding these pirates is the precedent its setting. For over forty years the United States’ avowed policy has been never to negotiate with Terrorists. In the 1990s we treated al Qaeda as a generally criminal matter - we allowed lawyers to set the rules of engagement for our CIA officers abroad, and we relegated domestic anti-terror efforts by the FBI to restrictive civilian courts. Today we treat the pirates as a generally criminal matter. Oh sure, we finally allowed the Navy SEALs to save the day in the MAERSK Alabama Incident, but for days prior to that we sent an FBI negotiator to deal with the Somali pirates…to no avail. This is supreme weakness on our part; one which the pirates will continue to exploit. However, there is even a worst group which will exploit this perceived weakness: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. In any type of conflict with the West, it is an almost 100% certainty that the Iranians will blockade or attack the Straits of Hormuz (another key oil transit chokepoint) in order to drive the price of oil up and hurt the West economically. The US has already had a lackluster response to North Korean nuclear brinksmanship, it has already stepped back from its aggressive stances on the Global War on Terror (renaming it and no longer using the terms “terrorist” or “terror attack”), and has now suffered the indignity of having its navy held at bay by four Somalis with archaic AK-47s. If the Obama Administration does not step it up regarding the War on Piracy, we could be emboldening not just the pirates but our other, greater enemies as well.

Regardless of what any future scenario may hold, the fact remains simple: the pirate threat will not go away and swift, bold action is required on our part. We should look back to our experiences with al Qaeda in Afghanistan and try not to repeat the mistakes which led to 9/11. Those mistakes were simple: we underestimated the enemy, misread their intentions, made several key, flawed assumptions; and failed to make the proper connections which ultimately led to a continuously flaccid policy on our part and only served to further embolden the enemy. This led to the disastrous 9/11. Just as the United States was in an undeclared war against Jihadists in 1996, the United States is now in an undeclared War on Piracy today. We must rebuff these pirates and prevent them from escalating the violence. Indeed, earlier today the pirates launched another attack on a US freighter, this time using heavier weapons, more men, and faster boats - already, they’re becoming emboldened and adapting their tactics. Although they were unsuccessful, they only have to be right once in order for them to win.

This is why no other policy besides my proposed foothold scenario will work. The Foothold Scenario takes care of the immediate threat before it requires a larger force commitment, whilst allowing us to have a permanent, yet light, presence in-country. This gives us the initiative: we can choose when and where we want to attack. Having this presence in-country will allow us to lay the groundwork for the inevitable nation-building strategy that will one day have to be adopted, to stop Somalia from continuing to be a major global destabilizing force. Had we done something like this in Afghanistan in the 90s (wage a low-intensity war with Special Forces as Bill Clinton considered doing before the Lewinski Scandal) we may have avoided 9/11. One thing is clear, however, our current policy - the policy of treating these pirates as criminals, the same policy we had toward al Qaeda in the 90s - is doomed to failure.

If we continue to place ourselves in a reactionary posture rather than an aggressive one, the attacks will get worst, and one day they could very well do serious damage to the global economy. The War on Piracy has already begun…when will we get the message?

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Bliss, Jeff. "U.S. Military Considers Attack on Somali Pirates' Land Bases." Bloomberg.com. 13 April 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aYhvgOfyTmYA&refer=us

Coll, Steve. "Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden From the Soviet Invasion to September 11, 2001." New York: Penguin Publishing, 2005.

Energy Information Administration. "World Oil Transit Chokepoints." Department of Energy. Jan. 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html

Gettlemen, Jeffrey. "The Most Dangerous Place In the World." Foreign Policy. March/April 2009. 62-69.